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Abstract
The paper proposes a theoretical model investigating the welfare consequences of tech-
nological shocks in a Ricardian framework (a la Dornbush, Fisher and Samuelson, 1977).
Contrary to existing literature, the model incorporates a nonhomothetic demand func-
tion whose price and income elasticities are endogenously determined by technology. The
model is applied to the case of trade between two economies with di¤erent development
levels. It is shown in particular that the developing country can experience a fall in utility
as a result of technical progress in the developed country. This result depends on the type
of technological shock assumed (biased vs. uniform technical progress), as well as on the
size of the development gap.
Keywords : Dornbush-Fisher-Samuelson Ricardian model ; Technology and Trade ;
North-South Trade ; Nonhomothetic preferences ; Hierarchic needs ; Hierarchic purchases
JEL Classi…cation : F11, O11
1 Introduction
The role of nonhomothetic preferences in the analysis of trade has experienced a sharp rise
in importance in the recent literature. This assumption about consumption behavior has
been included in a bunch of papers dealing with di¤erent questions such as the predicted
factor content of trade (Dinopoulos, Fujiwara and Shimomura (2006), Chung (2003)), the
e¤ects of trade liberalization or preferential trade agreements on welfare (Stibora and
de Vaal (2007), Stibora and de Vaal (2006)), the relation between income inequality and
trade ‡ows (Mitra and Trinidade (2003), Kugler and Zweimüller (2002)) and the in‡uence
of technological progress on the distribution of gains from trade (Matsuyama (2000)).
The reason for including nonhomothetic preferences in a trade model, despite the lower
tractability of this kind of function, is that there is much evidence to show that deviation
from homothetic preferences is not marginal. One illustration of this is provided by a
major …nding in the empirical literature devoted to this issue: Hunter (1991) proposes
a counter-factual analysis and shows that nonhomothetic preferences account for 25% of
world trade. In the same line, several empirical contributions prove that income elastic-
ities in trade are actually non unitary (see, for instance, Magee and Houthakker (1969),
Atesoglu (1993, 1994); Bairam, Dempster (1991); Perraton (2003) and Muscatelli et al.
(1994, 1995)). However, most contributions in the existing literature are based on the
assumption of homothetic preferences. This raises the question of whether certain im-
portant theoretical results in trade literature are robust to changes in the speci…cation of
preferences.
This paper is devoted to the old question of the international distribution of welfare
gains induced by technical progress. More speci…cally, I look at the relative ability of a
developing country to bene…t (in terms of welfare) from the external technical progress
through trade. Among the large literature devoted to this issue, the standard approach is
the Ricardian framework : according to Dornbush, Fisher and Samuelson (hereafter, DFS
(1977)), technical progress in one country always bene…ts the trading partner, through a
terms-of-trade deterioration for the fast-growing country. This theoretical result relies on
the use of a Cobb Douglas utility function yielding unitary income and price elasticities in
trade. It prevails in major inter-sectorial trade models such those of endogenous growth
(see for instance, Grossman and Helpman, chapter 7, 1991).
I propose here a ricardian model where non unitary elasticities in trade are microfunded
on the basis of non homothetic preferences1 . This model is related to the Ricardian inter-
sectorial trade models of Matsuyama (2000)2 . Actually, Matsuyama (2000) proposes a
nonhomothetic model which is considered as an alternative to the standard homothetic
model of DFS (1977). Matsuyama models nonhomothetic preferences through a function
of hierarchic desires, where agents extend the range of consumed goods when real income
increases. As the quantities of each good consumed are exogenously …xed to one, the
evolution of consumption can only be extensive. The common point shared by the Mat-
suyama and DFS models is that they …x, a priori, the evolution of consumption patterns
in the event of technical progress. In the DFS model, demand shifts towards those goods
which display the greatest decrease in relative price (so as to maintain the initial distribu-
tion of spending on each good). In Matsuyama’s approach, the change in demand favours
the lower priority goods produced by North.
By allowing agents to choose both the quantities and the range of goods consumed, I
1 The theoretical interpretation of non-unitary income elasticities in trade is not straightforward. Ac-
cording to McGregor and Swales (1986, 1991) and Krugman (1989), this result is a statistical artefact
resulting from a supply composition e¤ect. On the other hand, nonhomothetic preferences occupy a
central position in the post-Keynesian analysis of income elasticities of trade (Thirlwall (1979), Kaldor
(1970)). This debate lies outside the purposes of this paper. The choice of a nonhomothetic preference-
based approach is found in some empirical studies reported in section 2.1. More details can also be found
in studies which control for the supply side composition e¤ect in their estimations of export and im-
port functions: Amable (1992), Fagerberg (1988), Feenstra (1994), Gagnon (2003), Funke and Runwedel
(2001), Bayoumi (1999).
2 We can also refer to the nonhomothetic intra-sectorial models of Flam-Helpman (1987) and Stockey
(1991), which are discussed in detail in Matsuyama (2000).
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propose a new framework to account for non homothetic preferences alternative to Mat-
suyama (2000). The main speci…city of my approach is the link established between the
price and income elasticities of external demand, and the nature of the goods in which
each country is specialized. This link forwards by two transmission channels. Firstly,
I consider hierarchic consumption behavior. Goods are then distinguished according to
their relative degree of priority, which also determines their respective income and price
elasticity values. Secondly, the technological dimension is linked to the consumption be-
havior through a function of hierarchic purchases. In particular, I allow technical progress
to change the relative degree of priority of each good. The intuition behind this is that
technical progress, by the creation of new goods, leads to the creation of new needs, and
then modi…es the perception of agents regarding their pre-existing needs. This e¤ect is
formally expressed by the fact that elasticities are partially determined by technical coef-
…cients of production. Hence, technical progress has a direct impact on the distribution
of spending devoted to each good and on the range and quantities of goods consumed.
The aim of the paper is then to analyze the impact of technical progress on the interna-
tional distribution of welfare, in a framework where hierarchic consumption, non-uniform
substitution and income e¤ects are simultaneously included. Our main result is that South
can be harmed by technical progress in the North. This happens if technical progress is
biased toward lower priority goods and if the size of the technological gap between the
two countries is large. The decrease in South’s welfare occurs despite the fact that South’s
agent consumes a wider range of goods produced by North. This result derives directly
from the link established between preferences and technology. It is totally at odds with
results from main inter-sectorial Ricardian models, where an increase in the existing pat-
tern of comparative advantages leads to increased gains from trade (DFS (1977), Krugman
(1990), Matsuyama (2000)). On the contrary, our result suggests that, for less advanced
countries to avoid being harmed by North’s technical progress, there exists an optimal
level of development gap with their trading partners. Due to the complexity of the model,
I analytically study the case of a very large development gap between North and South.
I also provide simulations for the more general case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a closed-economy
model and the main properties of the demand functions are presented. In the third section,
these functions are incorporated into a Ricardian model of the type developed by DFS.
A model of North-South trade is then obtained where the price and income elasticities of
external demand are non-unitary and micro-founded. The …nal section is devoted to the
analysis of the impact of North’s technical progress on South’s welfare.
2 A nonhomothetic closed-economy model
2.1 Characteristics of consumption behavior
A series of macro- and microeconomic empirical studies on demand behavior provides
direct validation for the hypothesis of nonhomothetic preferences. We can notably con-
sider the following evidences. Firstly, Falkinger, Zweimüller (1996) and Jackson (1984)
show that a rise in income is accompanied by an extension in the range of goods con-
sumed by agents. Secondly, Hunter (1991), Hunter-Markusen (1988), Jackson (1984) and
Fillat-Francois (2004), test the empirical relevance of some speci…c nonhomothetic de-
mand functions (respectively, Stone Geary, Almost Ideal Demand System and hierarchic
consumption). They verify that when their income rises, agents do not distribute this
increase uniformly over all the goods they buy3 . Finally, a corollary from the empirical
validity of the previous nonhomothetic demand functions is that sector income elasticities
depend on the agent’s level of income.
3 It should be noted that, as the Hunter (1991), Hunter-Markusen (1988) and Francois-Fillat (2004)
studies rely on cross section data, they indirectly control for the impact of supply change composition on
demand income elasticities. One can also refer to the paper by Bills and Klenow (2000), who calculate
Engel’s curve by controlling for quality.
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We require a demand function which is consistent with these three previous stylized
facts: hierarchic consumption, non unitary income elasticities at the sectorial level, and a
link between demand income elasticities and agents’ levels of income. From a theoretical
point of view, our approach to preferences is then related to that of Jackson (1984) and
Hunter-Markusen (1988). They use a utility function of the following type:
U =
X
¯i log(qi + °i)di (1)
where qi corresponds to the quantity of good i consumed.
This quasi-homothetic utility function can produce a linear expenditure system (LES)
or a hierarchic linear expenditure system (HLES), depending on the sign of the constant
terms ° i. For instance, Hunter and Markusen (1988) consider negative constant terms.
In this way, they account for the need to satisfy a minimum consumption of an exogenous
number of sectors4 . Subsequently, the function produces (non unitary) income and sub-
stitution e¤ects. On the contrary, Jackson (1984) assumes a positive sign for the constant
terms: the utility function relies more on an endowment e¤ect, which produces hierarchic
consumption of an endogenous range of consumed goods. For some goods, the non neg-
ativity constraint may e¤ectively become binding. The main interest of this approach is
that it allows both for extensive and intensive demand behavior5 .
We follow Jackson’s approach. In this way, we can simultaneously account for non uni-
tary elasticities of demand at the sectorial level and hierarchic consumption. Nevertheless,
we modify the previous utility function in three ways. Firstly, it is expressed in continuum
so that we can obtain an expression for the marginal good. Secondly, the standard Cobb
Douglas coe¢cient ¯i is assumed to be equal to one. All goods in the utility function are
then symmetric, except as far as the endowment e¤ect is concerned. Thirdly, we make a
linear transformation by dividing the term in brackets in equation 1 by ° i: The purpose
of this last transformation is to obtain a function where only consumed goods enter into
the agent’s …nal utility6 . The individual utility function at the heart of our model can
then be written:
U =
1Z
0
log(
qi
° i
+ 1)di (2)
The maximization utility program of the representative consumer can be written:
Max U s:t:
1Z
0
piqidi = y
and qi ¸ 0
where pi and y correspond respectively to the price of good i and to the agent’s income.
U is given by equation 2.
We can write the Khun-Tucker conditions:
for i 2 K; 1
pi°i
> ¸ => qi =
1
pi¸
¡ ° i (3)
for i =2 K; 1
pi°i
< ¸ => qi = 0 (4)
for i = J;
1
pJ °J
= ¸ => qi = 0 (5)
4 One could also refer to the approaches of Markusen (1986), Matsuyama (1992) and Puga-Venables
(1999), who apply the minimum consumption framework in a model with two sectors.
5 Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006) propose a closed-economy model where the utility function presents
the same characteristics.
6 Otherwise, according to equation 1, for all goods consumed, utility is determined by i¯ log(qi + °i),
but non-consumed goods also enter into the agent’s utility through i¯ log(°i):Our transformation removes
this e¤ect.
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According to these conditions, a good will or will not be consumed depending on its
value for the term pi°i . This term determines hierarchic consumption and can then be
considered as an entry criterion. Ceteris paribus, the lower the value of this term, the
more likely it is that the good will be consumed, and the higher the priority attached
to it. Agents will consume lower priority goods only if what are perceived as more basic
needs have been already satis…ed in terms of quantity (following the equation 3)7.
To order the consumption process explicitly and determine the marginal good J , we
have to assume that the entry criterion follows an increasing monotonic function. This
assumption enables us to divide the continuum into two segments: that of consumed
goods i 2 K = [0; J [ and that of non-consumed goods i =2 K = [J; 1[ (…gure 1):
We can then write the Lagrange multiplier:
¸ =
Z
i2K
di
y +
JR
0
pi°idi
(6)
Using equations 5 and 6, we can determine an implicit equation in J for the extensive
demand function. Similarly, on the basis of equations 3 and 6 and simplifying by equation
7, we obtain an intensive demand function (qi):
J =
y +
JR
0
pi° idi
pJ °J
(7)
piqi = pJ°J ¡ pi°i if pi°i < pJ°J (8)
piqi = 0 if pi°i > pJ °J
In addition, using equations 3 and 6 and deriving the induced demand function, we
obtain an expression for demand income elasticity. In the same way, we can also deduce
two useful expressions for own-price and cross-price elasticities.
´iy =
1
J
:
y
piqi
(9)
´ip = ¡1 ¡
°i
qi
:
µ
1 ¡ 1
J
¶
< ¡1
´ip = ¡1 ¡
µ
pJ °J
piqi
¡ 1
¶
:
µ
1 ¡ 1
J
¶
(10)
´ipk =
1
J
:
pk°k
piqi
> 0 (11)
We now present changes in consumption behavior according to changes in income (y)
and in the ranking of the good in the continuum (i). The main properties of our demand
functions are summarized by seven theorems reported in table 1. We brie‡y present the
proofs for these theorems in annex 1.
From these theorems, we can highlight that in our model, the heterogeneity of agents’
consumption baskets depends partly on their levels of income, and partly on the charac-
teristics of the goods supplied (if it has higher or lower priority). Changes in consumption
7 On this point, we should explain why we have chosen to maintain sectorial di¤erences for the ° term.
By applying the same value for °i ; the entry criterion would only depend on relative prices (i.e. on unit
values). We wanted to avoid this e¤ect, as the model refers to an inter-sectorial approach. E¤ectively,
in this case, units are likely to vary from one sector to another, and there is no justi…cation for choosing
unit values as an entry criterion. The weighting with °i allows us to get around this problem. The term
°i then refers to a pure preference e¤ect, which determines the willingness of the agent to consume a
good. In addition, multiplication by pi accounts for the possibility of consuming it according to the price
structure (given the level of income). Because of this in‡uence of price on the composition of consumption,
preferences re‡ect hierachic purchases rather than hierachic desires.
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behavior resulting from an increase in income take the form of access to what had initially
been non-priority (T1), together with a non uniform variation in the spending on each
good (T2, T3). Based on equation 7, …gure 3 represents graphically the evolution of inten-
sive and extensive consumption with income8 . Our extensive demand function presents
also speci…c characteristics: income elasticities are in accordance with the stylized facts we
aim to account for, i.e. non uniform evolution of expenditures between sectors and agents.
More speci…cally, the last good to enter the consumption basket has the highest income
elasticity of demand (T5). Thus, every good, except the …rst one always consumed, can
be considered as a "luxury good" the …rst time it enters the agent’s consumption bas-
ket. With the entry of new goods, the previously-consumed goods tend to behave more
and more like necessity goods, as and when their weight in the consumption increases.
Furthermore, the agents’ perceptions of the degree of priority of each good vary with
their respective income levels. This is formally re‡ected by the fact that the lower the
agent’s relative level of income, the more sensitive demand for good i will be to variation
in income (T4).
Our extensive demand function presents two further main characteristics concerning
price elasticities. As with income elasticities, a good’s level of sensitivity to price variations
depends on its novelty. Agents tend to adapt their consumption in favour of the lower
priority goods when there is an uniform fall in prices, and to the detriment of these same
goods when there is a rise in prices (T6). These increasing values for price elasticities along
the continuum seem reasonable: the higher the good’s priority, the less it is substitutable.
Finally, according to the cross-price elasticity expression, the substitution e¤ect is higher
than the income e¤ect. In addition, the lower the good’s priority, the more its demand is
sensitive to the price variation of another good (T7).
The ranking of goods in the continuum according to their degree of priority and the pre-
vious properties of our model both hold under the assumption of an increasing monotonic
function for the entry criterion pi° i. The supply side of the model is de…ned such as
to verify this relation. In this way, we establish a link between preferences and technol-
ogy : agents’ perceptions of the priority of each good appear to be dependant on the
technological dimension.
2.2 The link between technology and preferences
The supply side of the closed economy is modeled in a very simple way. We assume a
single-input (labor) production function with constant returns. There are no pro…ts in
the economy. Each agent’s income is then given by the wage level. The national income
corresponds to total wages uniformly distributed over the population. We denote ai, the
quantity of labor required to produce one unit of good i: We assume perfect competition,
so that the prices of goods are given by wage (w) and the inverse of labor productivity
(ai):
pi = aiw (12)
Without losing generality, we can assume that goods are ranked in the continuum in
increasing order, so that the parameters of the model satisfy the following relation:
ai°i increasing function of i (13)
Thus, using equation 12, pi° i is also an increasing function of i. All the properties of
the consumption function described above are therefore maintained.
We should highlight the fact that the way technical progress will in‡uence equilibrium
consumption derives straightforwardly from our way of modeling the hierarchic consump-
tion behavior. By applying equation 12 and proposition 13 to our HLES, we e¤ectively
8 It should be noted that the choice of a convex curve for pi°i is arbitrary. Theorems are valid for the
general case.
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establish a link between technical progress and preferences. Technical progress, by modi-
fying the values of ai° i and the entry criterion pi° i, will impact on the range of consumed
goods, the share of spending devoted to each good, and their respective income and price
elasticities of demand (equations 7-11). Actually, our goods ranking, which combines a
technological criterion9 (ai) and a criterion based on the utility function (° i) ; expresses
the fact that a technological shock (via ai) or a preference shock (via ° i) have the same
impact on the composition and evolution of consumption. This equivalence is supported
by two arguments. Firstly, technical progress and increases in real income are two sides
of the same phenomenon. Accordingly, every increase in income (or technical advance)
involves changes in the distribution of expenditures between goods, because of Engel’s
law [Pasinetti, 1983, p. 69]. Secondly, the equivalence between a technological shock and
a preference shock is based on the following intuition. When a technical advance results
in the creation of new goods, it also entails the creation of new needs and modi…es agents’
perceptions of pre-existing goods (in terms of needs)10 . We could say that the boundary
line between "essential" needs and "psychological" needs is modi…ed1 1 .
The mechanism of an endogenous change in consumption behavior with technical
progress is at the heart of our theoretical results. Technical progress, by changing real
income, is likely to modify the range of consumed goods (theorem 1). But at the same
time, in our model, technical progress also induces a change in the threshold level of the
quantities consumed necessary to extend the range of consumption (equation 8). Variation
in utility therefore depends on the evolution of these two components, quantities and range
of goods consumed, which may not change in the same way. This kind of endogenous
change in consumption is graphically represented in …gure 4.
At this point, it may be useful to compare our approach to preferences with that of DFS
and Matsuyama. The di¤erences in demand behavior in the three models are presented
in table 2. Our model is clearly distinct from DFS, where there is an homothetic demand
function of the Cobb Douglas type. This exogenously constraints the range of consumed
goods and the distribution of spending between goods. Nevertheless, the two models can
considered close insofar as they both allow for endogenous determination of quantities
consumed. Our approach also appears to be closely related to that of Matsuyama (2000),
based on an utility function of hierarchic desires1 2. In this case, agents consume one unit
of each good according to an order of priority that is …xed a priori. As in our model, the
range of consumed goods, and subsequently the share of spending devoted to each good,
are endogenous. Nevertheless, his approach di¤ers from our own in that he only allows
for an extensive change in consumption behavior: income and price elasticities are null
for each good.
We now embed our demand function in a Ricardian trade framework. The di¤erences
described above concerning the utility function of the three approaches will be re‡ected
by di¤erences in the mechanisms involved in the trade balance equilibrium.
9 Fixed capital is not explicitly introduced into the model. However, we consider that the input of labor
represents e¤ective labor, i.e. a composite (comprising labor, capital, and human capital).
10 Like Young (1991), we have not modeled the innovation of goods in our model: an in…nite number
of goods are theoretically available for consumption, but some of them are too expensive to be produced.
Technical progress makes it possible to produce these goods by reducing production costs.
11 We should stress the fact that in our model, no goods, except the …rst one, can be considered essential
in physiological terms. It is only the perception of the agents (according to income and price structure)
which makes each of them relatively essential.
12 The function of hierarchic desires is often used to link consumption expenditures with income distri-
bution (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) or Zweimüller (2000)). This is also the case in Matsuyama
(2000). To be able to compare his approach with our own, we only consider the characteristics of his
model under the assumption of a representative agent (i.e. with an uniform income distribution).
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3 The nonhomothetic Ricardian model
3.1 International specializations and consumption
We consider two economies with di¤erent levels of development. The more developed
economy is the foreign one, and it is denoted by an asterisk. The foreign wage is the
numeraire (w¤ = 1) and the domestic wage (w) then re‡ects the relative wage. The general
structure of the open-economy model is established following the standard hypotheses of
DFS (1977). Firstly, it is assumed that competition in the two countries is perfect. There
is therefore an international price pmi ; which corresponds to the trade equilibrium at
pmi = Min fpi; p¤i g : Secondly, the foreign economy is more developed in the sense that it
is more productive, in absolute terms, in every sector a¤i < ai: Thirdly, the productivity
advantage of the developed country increases along its goods continuum, i.e. aia¤i is an
increasing function of i.
We can demonstrate that under the hypotheses of a technological gap increasing along
the whole goods continuum of the developed country, and of an identical utility function
in the two countries, the ranking of goods (in terms of priority level) in the developed
country entails an identical ranking in the developing country:
if
@a¤i ° i
@i
> 0 and
@ aia¤i
@i
> 0 then
@ai°i
@i
> 0
In other words, the ranking of goods established for the developed economy is an
"international" ranking. We can therefore identify the comparative advantage of each
country in terms of the nature of goods respectively traded. Like Matsuyama (2000),
we thus establish a relation between the characteristics of a country (its level of devel-
opment) and the characteristics of the goods in which it specializes (relative degree of
priority). Formally, the specialization equation which determines the segment of South’s
specializations
£
0; i
¤
and, which holds also in the models of Matsuyama and DFS, can be
written:
w =
a¤
i
ai
(14)
Given the hypothesis of the technology gap, trade can only take place if, for all i 2£
0; i
¤
; p¤i > pi : For the developing country to be competitive in this goods segment, the
minimum condition is that w < 1. The developing economy will then be specialized in
the beginning of the goods continuum, i.e. in goods with higher priorities. These goods
present a relatively lower technological gap and lower income elasticity of demand (see
theorem 5)13 .
Concerning consumption, the marginal goods consumed in the two countries can be
determined using equation 7:
J =
w +
JR
0
pmi ° idi
°JpmJ
(15)
J ¤ =
1 +
J¤R
0
pmi ° idi
°J¤pmJ¤
(16)
13 It can be noted that this characteristic allows us to interpret the degree of priority of each good in
terms of the degree of sophistication. Empirical studies provide evidence in favor of a positive relation
between income level and the share of expenditures devoted to the importated technological, di¤erentiated,
and higher quality goods (see respectively, Meliciani (2002), Francois and Kaplan (1996), Hallak (2003)).
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Because agents in the two countries face identical prices for goods; the di¤erence in
relative wage expresses a di¤erence in real income. We can therefore apply the main
theorems de…ned in the closed economy.
Corol lary 1 : The developed country consumes more products and these products are
lower priority.
E¤ectively, using theorem 1 and relation 13, and given that the relative wage is less
than one; we can write J ¤ > J and therefore pmJ¤ °J¤ > p
m
J °J :
According to this corollary and the previous assumptions about the technological di-
mension, the structure of consumption and specializations induced by the model can be
summarized as in table 314 .
3.2 Trade equilibrium
We make the standard assumption of a balance of trade equilibrium constraint where
X and M represent respectively the exports of the developing country (imports of the
developed country) and the imports of the developing country (exports of the developed
country). On the basis of equations 8 and 12, we can write:
X = M
iZ
0
pmi q
¤
i L
¤di =
JZ
i
pmi qiLdi
iL¤a¤J¤°J¤ ¡ wL¤
iZ
0
ai° idi = (J ¡ i)La¤J°J ¡ L
JZ
i
a¤i ° idi
Re-writing the last term (of the right hand side) using equation 15, we obtain, after
simpli…cation:
w =
i
£
L¤a¤
J¤ °J¤ + La
¤
J°J
¤
L + (L + L¤)
iR
0
ai°idi
(17)
We have …nally obtained a system of four equations (14-17) with four unknowns, which
must satisfy the following conditions: 0 < i < J < J¤:
Concerning the last expression, it should be noted that it is no easy task analyzing this
trade balance equation, as it includes many endogenous variables (w; i;J; J¤). Neverthe-
less, we can make some comments on the partial e¤ects of the entry criterion terms (ai° i),
that which will highlight the potential impact of technical progress on trade equilibrium.
Firstly, in the numerator, a¤
J¤ °J¤ and a
¤
J°J ; refer to the threshold value of the marginal
consumed good in each country. According to equation 8, the spending on each good is
positively related to these terms. At the same time, according to equations 15-16, the
range of consumed goods in each country decreases with these terms. Thus, a decrease
in these boundary terms (through North’s technical progress) is likely to hurt South’s
relative wage by lowering the spending devoted on its goods. On the contrary, a decrease
in the integral value in the denominator re‡ects an higher gap between the threshold
value of the marginal consumed good (a¤
J¤ °J¤ ; a
¤
J°J), and the threshold value of South’s
products (a i° i). This is likely to result in higher spending on each of South’s products
(equation 8), and then in an increase in the relative wage.
14 Concerning the structure of trade, we can also note that North is specialized in a wider range of
products. This characteristic comes directly from theorem 2 and 3 applied to the trade balance condition.
It is in accordance with some recent empirical studies which highlight the fact that high income per capita
countries export a wider range of products. See, in particular, Hummels and Klenow’s paper (2005).
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At this point, it is again worthy to compare the mechanisms involved in the adjustment
of our trade balance equilibrium with those of Matsuyama and DFS. Looking at table 4,
the di¤erences between the three models are straightforward15 . In DFS, the trade balance
equilibrium does not depend on technical coe¢cients. This is due to the Cobb Douglas
function, according to which the share of spending on each good is …xed by the parameter
¯i. Every technical progress will have the e¤ect of increasing the quantity demanded in
proportion to the fall in price. In Matsuyama, the trade balance equilibrium no longer
depends on the relative wage, but only on South’s technical coe¢cients. This comes from
the use of the function of hierarchic desires, where the quantities demanded are constrained
to one. As North is specialized in lower priority goods, this entails that agents in the two
countries only use their increase in real income to demand goods produced by North.
It follows that demand for South’s products is insensitive to price variation, and hence
to wage variation. The only way to modify external demand for South is through its
own technical progress, enabling it to extend its range of specializations. In other words,
under a function of hierarchic desires and an uniform distribution of income within each
country, di¤erences in income elasticities in trade are "apparent". They are determined
by the relative ability of each country to extend its range of traded goods16 . North is
in this case more favored, as every change in real income is used to demand its (lower
priority) goods. Contrary to our approach, non unitary income elasticities in trade, in
Matsuyama’s model, are then not founded on the characteristics of the good itself, but
on the assumption of an unconditional preference for North’s goods. This distinction
between the two models is at the heart of the di¤erences in the trade balance equations.
Finally, one should insist on the fact that the simultaneous inclusion of extensive and
intensive consumption di¤erentiates strongly our model from these two approaches. Rel-
ative wage is still a determinant of our trade balance equilibrium, because of demand
sensitivity to price variation. Moreover, the inclusion of both countries’ technical coef-
…cients in the trade balance equilibrium accounts for our endogenous elasticities. This
re‡ects the impact of every technical progress on the share of spending devoted to each
country.
We now turn to the implication of our approach for the analysis of the international
di¤usion of welfare gains through trade. According to the above comparisons, we have
decided to devote a particular intention to the impact (on South’s welfare) of a North’s
technical progress biased toward the less priority goods in the case of a large technological
gap. E¤ectively, we expect speci…c results in that con…guration at least for two reasons.
Firstly, in our model, the size of the technological gap between the two countries will have
a direct in‡uence on the value of trade elasticities, as the latter depends on the level of
income of the agents. Secondly, the nature of the technical progress is also expected to be
crucial because a good’s demand elasticity depends directly on its technical coe¢cient of
production. The analytical study of this case is conduced under speci…c functional forms
and completed by simulations.
4 The e¤ect of a North’s technical progress on South’s
welfare
4.1 The critical in‡uence of the size of the technological gap and
the nature of the technical progress
The choice of a functional form for a Ricardian inter-sectorial trade framework is not a
trivial issue. In the standard interpretation of Dornbush, Fisher and Samuelson (1977), the
15 The main equations of the models of Matsuyama and DFS are presented in annex 3a.
16 Following Krugman (1989), these aggregate elasticities of external demand can be viewed as "appar-
ent" because they do not refer to the evolution of demand for a given consumption basket, but to the
changes in the composition of traded goods.
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continuum of goods involves di¤erent sectors, the characteristics of which are not de…ned.
The only precision made concerning sector characteristics is a ranking of goods along
the continuum as a function of the relative productivity gap between the two countries.
Krugman (1990) proposed an extension of the theoretical interpretation that can be made
of the DFS model: he argued that the ranking of goods according to the productivity gap
corresponds to the ranking of goods according to their technological content. However,
choosing a functional form which can take into account the link between technological
content and sector productivity is no easy task, insofar as that if the continuum involves
di¤erent sectors, the respective units of each good are likely to be di¤erent. In other
words, it is impossible directly to establish the relation between ai and i. In our model,
we get around this problem by not directly …xing the functional form of ai ; but only that
of ai°i ; which we have de…ned as an increasing function of i (relation 13):In other words,
we do not …x the primitives of the expressions for ai° i and a¤i ° i. We propose to use the
following functional forms:
ai°i = ® + ¯:i (18)
a¤i °i = ®
¤ + ¯ ¤:i (19)
In addition, our hypotheses about the technological gap will enable us to constrain
parameter values. For an absolute productivity advantage increasing along the continuum,
the su¢cient condition to allow South to be competitive in the …rst part of the continuum
is:
¯
¯¤
>
®
®¤
> 1
In this case, the ratio of production costs ( a
¤
i
ai ) decreases along the whole continuum
with an asymptote tending to ¯
¤
¯ :
We rewrite the general equilibrium model by applying the equations 18-19 to the
system 14-17 and verify that an analytical solution exists17 . We then analyze the e¤ect
on South’s utility of a biased technical progress (toward the less priority goods) in North
when the technological gap is large This con…guration is formally equivalent to a decrease
in the value of ¯¤ when this parameter is very small (relatively to ¯). To simplify the
analysis, we study trade equilibrium around ¯¤ = 0:
To do this, we denote " =
p
¯¤ and proceed to marginal developments of our equilib-
rium equations around " = 0: Results are the following ones :
i = ei(1 ¡ a:") (20)
w = ew:(1 + b:") (21)
J =
ej
"
:(1 + c:") (22)
J¤ =
ej¤
"
:(1 ¡ d:") (23)
ei; ew;ej;ej¤; a; b; c and d are all positive parameters obtained after marginal development
of equilibrium equations (their expressions are reported in annex 2c).
By including (20-23) in equation 2 we obtain an expression for South’s utility. With
the same methodology (marginal developments), we can demonstrate that South’s utility
can be represented, around " = 0; by an equation of the following form :
U = A + B:" (24)
where :
17 See annexes 2a and 2b.
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A =
®
¯
: log
®
(® + ¯ei) +ei + l(1 + l) : 1(® + ¯ei)
B = 1
(® + ¯ei):®¤ :(1 + l) :
Ãej¤ ¡ ej
1 + l
+
ej
3
!
In …gure 5, we have represented for speci…c value of parameters the equation 24 as well
as the general utility equation (2). This con…rms that equation (24) is good approximation
of our utility function around " = 0:
The two terms A and B are positive ( ej ¤ > ej): This implies that the utility of the
developing country is an increasing function of the term " =
p
¯¤: Hence, the result of
this analysis is that when the size of the technological gap increases (when " tends toward
0), the utility of the developing country decreases.
As a …rst comment, it is worthy to compare this result with those obtained by Mat-
suyama (2000) and DFS (1977) under the same con…guration. In their model, the following
Ricardian property is always veri…ed: as trade gains are derived from the existence of dif-
ferences between countries, when these di¤erences grow larger, i.e. when technological
shocks augment the existing terms of comparative advantage, the transaction gains in-
crease1 8 . In other words, a biased technical progress in North improves South’s welfare.
Actually, the di¤erence between these both approaches and our own model can be ex-
plained on the basis of equation 20. E¤ectively, looking at equations 20-23, one can note
that around " = 0; if the impact of ¯¤ on w and on J; J ¤ is standard (respectively positive
and negative), this is no more the case for i: The equation 20 implies that, the range of
South’s specialization is negatively related with the cost of production of North. Before
discussing in more details the mechanisms at the heart of this "non standard" relation-
ship, we aim to complete our analysis by looking for what happens outside the previous
con…guration. We proceed by simulations and relax …rst, the assumption of a very large
technological gap, and second that of a biased technical progress.
For our simulations, we consider three di¤erent equilibriums, in order to measure the
extent to which the qualitative results produced by the simulations are sensitive to the size
of technological gap (simul 1, 2 and 3). These con…gurations di¤er in the value given to the
parameter ¯¤. Table 5 presents the values taken by the di¤erent variables for these three
initial equilibriums. We adopt a comparative static procedure and then study South’s
utility in the case of a foreign technical progress biased towards the most sophisticated
goods (FNUTS, variation of ¯¤), and in the case of a foreign uniform technical shock
(FUTS, identical variation in ®¤; ¯¤). These technological shocks are formally re‡ected
by a reduction in the parameters concerned by one half.
Simulations results con…rm that the size and the nature of the shock are two conditions
for the appearance of a con…guration where South’s utility decreases as a result of a
technical progress in North. E¤ectively, by comparing tables 5 and 6, we can see that
even in the case of a very large technological gap, the South always bene…ts from North’s
technical progress when the latter is uniform along the continuum. Also, in the case
of a technical progress in the developed country growing over
£
i; J¤
¤
; the utility of the
developing country fall only under a large technological gap. This con…guration appears
for simul 2 and 3 (compare tables 5 and 7). The existence of a threshold e¤ect after which
the developing country may present a decrease of its utility appears clearly in …gure 6.
We now turn to the description of the main mechanisms embedded in our model which
are at the heart of the process of immeserizing in South after a technical progress in North.
18 Result of Matsuyama and DFS can directly be derived from their conditions of specialization (equation
14) and their trade balance equilibrium (table 3). We have also reported graphically the impact of technical
shock in …gures of annex 3b.
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4.2 Mechanisms at the heart of an immeserizing e¤ect of external
growth
It is worthy to begin by an explanation of our results in the case of an uniform technical
progress in the North. According to our simulations, in this con…guration, the classical
e¤ect of welfare gain di¤usion holds, whatever the size of the technological gap. This
can be explained in the following way. Given uniform technical progress in the developed
country, the productivity gap between the two countries increases uniformly. According
to the specialization equation (14), this entails a fall in the relative wage. But this fall
stimulates demand for goods produced by the developing country, limiting the deterio-
ration in its terms of trade. At the new equilibrium, the fall in the relative wage does
not completely o¤set the initial productivity gains (…gures 7). Welfare increases in both
countries. It can be noted that this result tallies with that of DFS, but di¤ers from that
of Matsuyama, where the developing country is totally impervious to the developed coun-
try’s technical progress. The comparison between our result and that of Matsuyama is
particularly interesting. This highlights the fact that, despite unfavorable elasticities in
trade, trade remains a good way to bene…t from external technical progress, once we have
allowed South to bene…t from price competitiveness.
Concerning now the di¤erences implied by a biased technical progress, the decrease
in South’s utility can be explained in the following way. Our modeling of preferences
entails that the development gap (the di¤erence in per capita income) determines the
di¤erences in income and price elasticities between the two countries. We can make two
observations about this e¤ect. Firstly, in a similar fashion to the uniform shock described
above, the developing country is relatively penalized by its elasticities in trade. Secondly,
according to theorem 6, we have seen that in our model, price elasticities increase along
the continuum. Under a shock biased towards the lower priority goods, the goods which
bene…t from the highest price elasticities are then those which bene…t from the largest
falls in price. The price elasticity and income elasticity e¤ects contribute jointly to a
pronounced change in the distribution of expenditures in favor of the goods produced by
the developed country. The balance of trade equilibrium condition therefore requires a
fall in the relative wage, such that the developing country may see a fall in its aggregate
real income. As can be seen in …gures 8, the real costs of some consumed goods for
the developing country have risen. More precisely, the adverse impact of North’s biased
technical progress appears to be conduced by two e¤ects. Firstly, some goods which were
previously produced by North are now produced by South, and consumed with higher
real prices. Secondly, the fall in the relative wage reduces South’s purchasing power
for some of North’s goods. Actually, South does not bene…t from an reinforcement of
the existing terms of comparative advantage, because the strong change in the spending
patterns forces South to extend its specializations, despite the reduction in its comparative
advantages (see tables 5 and 7; equation 22). The wider the development gap between
the two countries, the more this extension, necessary to return to the trade balance
equilibrium, will penalize the developing country in terms of changes in purchasing power.
One should also insist on another characteristic of our model : technical progress
hurts the South despite the fact that South’s agents ultimately consume more sophisti-
cated goods at lower prices (J increases). This result di¤ers strongly from Matsuyama’s
approach, where J can be viewed as a direct measure of utility. In our model, changes in
agents’ utilities have to be apprehended through changes in the quantities and range of
goods consumed. What happens here is that the increase in utility induced by a wider
range of consumed goods is o¤set by lower quantities of each good consumed. With this
kind of shock, there is actually a stronger change in the slope of the curve pi°iw ; compared
with the changes entailed by an uniform shock (see …gures 7 and 8). This change re‡ects
the strong modi…cation in the consumption behavior of the agents, especially in their per-
ception of the relative priority of each good. With a ‡atter curve, agents view goods that
had been previously considered as lower priority goods, as now having relatively more
priority. They extend the range of consumed goods accordingly. At the same time, the
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spending on relatively higher priority goods decreases (equation 8). This means that the
fall in real income results in a reduction in the level of satisfaction provided by each good.
In other words, in our model, changes in price structure indirectly account for changes in
what we can call the "standard of consumption": South’s agents import a wider range
of sophisticated goods (for instance, televisions or cell phones), to the detriment of the
quantities of each good consumed (housing, clothes, etc.)19 .
Finally, it is worthy to brie‡y explain the reasons for which this con…guration doesn’t
appear in the approaches of Matsuyama (2000) and DFS (1977). The di¤erence with
our own model comes from the fact that, according to their assumption on preferences,
in both other models the range of specialization does not increase as a result of this
kind of shock. Notably, as it has been already noted, in Matsuyama’s model the trade
balance condition is not modi…ed by biased foreign technical progress. Consequently, the
range of South’s specializations remains constant. The fall in the relative wage is directly
determined in equation 14 by the decrease in productivity of the marginal good i: As
the productivity gains are increasing along
£
i; J ¤
¤
; this implies that South’s consumers
bene…t from an increase in their purchasing power for all goods after i. In the DFS
model, North’s technical progress is accompanied by a reduction in South’s specializations.
South’s consumers bene…t from an increase in welfare through the increasing purchasing
power gains along the goods continuum.
To conclude, the endogenous change in consumption and specialization in our model
can be interpreted from the perspective of the product cycle theory20 . The biased technical
progress in North has two main e¤ects on specializations. On the one hand, it stimulates
North’s production of sophisticated products, and on the other hand, it induces North to
give up the production of less sophisticated goods (which are being produced by South).
South’s access to more sophisticated goods increases, because of the standardization of
North’s production. At the same time, South becomes more competitive in some products,
because of the increase in its relative poverty.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a new framework for analyzing the changes in South’s welfare induced
by domestic and external technical progress. Our main contribution concerns the way we
model consumption behavior. We have considered a hierarchic linear expenditure system.
Goods can then be distinguished according to their order of entry into the consumption
basket. This determines their relative degree of priority, and their respective income
and price elasticity values. Moreover, we have established a link between these goods’
characteristics and the technological dimension. In this way, agents’ perceptions of the
relative priority of goods are dependent on the type of technical progress. We have
compared our results with those of Matsuyama (2000) and DFS (1977). As in our model,
Matsuyama establishes a connection between technical progress, its income e¤ect, and the
change in spending patterns due to nonhomothetic preferences. This also highlights the
di¤erential impact of technical progress on welfare, depending on specialization patterns.
19 Some vertically di¤erentiated models also produce a con…guration where North’s technical progress
may be immiserizing for South. Nevertheless, the mechanisms involved are di¤erent. For instance,
Stockey (1991) assumes a model where vertically di¤erentiated goods are imperfect substitutes. North’s
agents then consume a wider range of quality goods. She shows that external progress is immiserizing for
South, if it is biased toward non-traded goods (i.e. high quality goods consumed only by North). In our
model, this con…guration appears even if the technical progress bene…ts traded goods. Flam and Helpam
(1987), consider a model with heterogenous population in each country. South (North) produces a low
(high) quality good consumed by poor agents in the two countries. In this case, the global distribution
of spending is dependant on the distribution of income. If the distribution of income shifts toward the
agents who consume high quality goods, this entails a change of spending patterns in favor of North. The
subsequent improvement in its terms of trade may be immiserizing for South. In our model, South can
lose even under our assumption of a representative agent.
20 See for instance, the three stages of product developement in Vernon (1966, 1979), the models of
Grossman and Helpman (1991), and the empirical studies of Schoot (2004), Feenstra-Rose (2000), and
Hummels-Klenow (2005).
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The main contribution of our model, compared with that of Matsuyama, involves our
endogenous demand for quantities (and the subsequent endogenous income and price
elasticities). By giving up the constraint of the (0,1) consumption framework, we bring
new insights concerning the mechanisms at the heart of evolutions in welfare. More
speci…cally, technical progress, by changing price structure, also modi…es the relative
priority of goods. This e¤ect is notably re‡ected by a change in the level of spending
(devoted to each good), necessary to extend the range of consumption. We have called
this e¤ect the endogenous change in the "standard of consumption". We have shown
that our model can present results that are a priori paradoxical in a Ricardian context:
when there is technical progress in North biased towards the most technological goods,
the greater the di¤erence between the two countries, the less the developing country
gains from trade. Technical progress in North may then be immeserizing for South. This
implies that there exists a level of development gap which maximize the welfare gains
from trade. This result can be viewed as the re‡ection of an adverse impact of a product
cycle mechanism, which is driven by consumption behavior.
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TABLES
Table 1: Main characteristics of our demand function
Income variation (y) Rank of good variation (i)
Range of products @J@y > 0 T1
Share of spending @piqi@y > 0 T2
@piqi
@ i < 0 T3
Income elasticities @´
i
y
@y < 0 T4
@´iy
@i > 0 T5
Price elasticities
@j´ipj
@ i > 0 T6
Cross-price elasticities @´
i
pk
@ i > 0 T7
Table 2: Main properties of the demand function of the three models
DFS (1977)
C obb Do uglas
Mats (2000)
Hierarchic des ires
Current model
Hiera rchic purchases
´iy = 1 0 ´iy(y; i)
´ip = 1 0 ´ip(y; i)
J = J ¤ = cst J(y; p) J (y; p)
qi = qi(y; p) 1 qi(y; p)
piqi
y = ¯i = cst
piqi
y (J; p)
piqi
y (J; qi ; p)
Table 3: Structure of consumption and specializations in the two countries
Specializations Price Country of production Country of consumption£
0; i
¤
wai Developing country Both countries£
i; J
¤
a¤i Developed country Both countries
[J;J ¤] a¤i Developed country Developed country
Table 4: Trade balance equilibrium conditions
DFS (1977) Matsuyama (2000)
wL
1R
i
¯i = L¤
iR
0
¯ i L = (L + L¤)
iR
0
aidi
Table 5: Initial equilibriums according the technological gap
Initial equilibriums U U ¤ w i J J¤
(for each simul: ®=®¤ = 2)
Simul 1 (¯=¯ ¤ = 6; 7) 6,7 15,0 0,31 2,6 14,2 25,7
Simul 2 (¯=¯ ¤ = 66; 7) 7,2 27,4 0,19 4,0 32,7 80,5
Simul 3 (¯=¯ ¤ = 1010; 1) 6.8 38.9 0.14 5.8 97.0 310.2
[® = 0:045; ®¤ = 0:0225; ¯ = 0:020; L = L¤ = 1]
Table 6: Equilibriums after foreign uniform technical shock (FUTS)
Equilibriums after FUTS U U¤ w i J J ¤
(for each simul: ®=®¤ = 4)
Simul 1 (¯=¯ ¤ = 13; 3) 6.9 23.6 0.16 2.1 14.6 36.4
Simul 2 (¯=¯ ¤ = 133; 3) 7.5 46.5 0.10 3.5 34.6 114.8
Simul 3 (¯=¯ ¤ = 2020; 2) 7.0 72,0 0,07 5,5 101,7 444,5
Table 7: Equilibriums after foreign non uniform technical shock (FNUTS)
Equilibriums after FNUTS U U ¤ w i J J¤
(for each simul: ®=®¤ = 2)
Simul 1 (¯=¯ ¤ = 13; 3) 7.0 18.6 0.26 2.9 18.0 36.2
Simul 2 (¯=¯ ¤ = 133; 3) 7.1 31.0 0.17 4.5 42.7 113.5
Simul 3 (¯=¯ ¤ = 2020; 2) 6,77 40,6 0,13 6,1 130,6 438,0
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FIGURES
Figure 1: Range of consumed goods according to the entry criterion ( 1pi°i )
 1/(pigi) 
l 
J
(0; J) represent the segment of consumed goods under the assumption of a decreasing
monotonic function for 1pi°i
Figure 2: Proof of theorem 1:The number of consumed goods J is an increasing
function of y
 
J 
pigi pJgJ 
pigi 
y 
òiÎK pigidi 
As y increases, the area of the triangle above the curve pi° i increases, which is expressed
by an increase of consumed goods:
Figure 3: The change of the quantities and varieties consumed with income variation
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Along the continuum, the distance between pJ°J and pi°i indicates the spending
devoted to each good.
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Figure 4: The impact of prices change on the composition of consumption
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Figures 5: South’s utility
The general function (equation 2) is represented by the normal line and the border case
(around " = 0) by the doted line (equation 24).
Figure 6: Utility in developing country and technological gap
6,4
6,6
6,8
7,0
7,2
7,4
7 19 55 157 451
The vertical axis represents the utility of developing country and the horizontal axis
reports the value taken by ¯=¯¤ (under the asumptions ®=®¤ = 2 and constant)
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Figures 7: E¤ect of FUTS on real prices of goods (p
m
i
w ) consumed by devel-
oping country21
FUTS / Simul 1
FUTS / Simul 2
FUTS / Simul 3
21 The horizontal axis corresponds to the continuum of goods (i). The normal line represents the real
price of consumed goods in South before the shock. The doted line represents the real price of these goods
after the shock. The break in the lines refers to i:
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Figures 8: E¤ect of FNUTS on real prices of goods ( p
m
i
w ) consumed by
developing country
FNUTS / Simul 1
FNUTS / Simul 2
FNUTS / Simul 3
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ANNEXES
ANNEX 1: Demonstrations of seven theorems on consumption
Theorem 1 : The number of goods consumed J is an increasing function of y
This can be demonstrated graphically using equation 7 (…gure 2). When y increases,
the number of goods consumed J increases, as does its threshold value pJ°J : This is
expressed by the increase in the area of the triangle above the curve pi°i : For given prices
of goods, the values of variables pJ °J and J therefore represent a wealth e¤ect.
Theorem 2 : The amount spent on each good piqi is an increasing function of y
This is proved simply by applying theorem 1 in equation 8: as J and therefore pJ °J
are an increasing function of y, it follows that the amount spent on each good piqi is also
an increasing function of y:
Theorem 3 : The amount spent on each good piqi is a decreasing function of i
This can also be demonstrated on the basis of equation 8, according to which, the
amount spent on a good piqi is given by the gap between the threshold e¤ect value of the
marginal good and the threshold e¤ect value of the good i. The amount spent on each
good is therefore a decreasing function of that good’s position in the continuum:
Theorem 4: Income elasticity ´iy is a decreasing function of y
This is proved by using equation 9 to calculate the expression pk°k of good k which
satis…es the condition ´ky = 1: To prove this theorem, it is then su¢cient to verify that
when income increases, this good corresponds to a higher index value in the continuum,
@pk°k=@y > 0. Given that income elasticities increase along the continuum (theorem 5),
we denote k (´ky = 1) the good which marks the limit between the "luxury goods" segment
(´iy > 1) and the "necessity goods" segment (´ jy < 1). Using equations 8 and 9, and after
transformation (using equation 7), we can write for this good:
pk°k =
JR
0
pi° idi
J
(25)
To prove theorem 4, we must verify that when income increases, the good k (which
satis…es the condition ´ky = 1) corresponds to a higher index value in the continuum of
goods( @(pk°k)@ y > 0). Using partial derivative, one can …rst deduce from theorem 1 that
@J
@y > 0: Second, it is straightforward to show that when we calculate the partial derivative
according to J and simplify the result (using equation 7), we obtain:
@(pk°k )
@J
=
y
J 2
> 0
Theorem 5 : Income elasticity ´iy is an increasing function of i
This theorem is directly proved by applying theorem 3 to equation 9.
Theorem 6 : The absolute value of price elasticity
¯¯
´ip
¯¯
is an increasing function of i
This can be directly derived from the application of theorem 3 to equation 10.
Theorem 7 : The substitution e¤ect is an increasing function of i (for a given change
in the price of a good k)
This is proved directly by applying theorem 3 to equation 11.
ANNEX 2a: New equilibrium conditions
On the basis of equations (14-17) and (18-19), we can write :
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w =
®¤ + ¯¤:i
® + ¯:i
(26)
J 2 = i2 +
w
¯¤
(2 ¡ ¯i2) (27)
J ¤2 = i2 +
(2 ¡ w¯i2)
¯ ¤
(28)
Consequently, it is indeed veri…ed that J ¤ > J when w < 1:
On the basis of these three equations, we can determine a polynomial for i:
P (i) =
®¤
Ã
l ¡ (1 + l)¯i
2
2
!
+¯¤i
µ
l + (1 + l)i(® +
¯i
2
) ¡ ¡® + ¯i¢ (J ¤ + lJ )¶ (29)
= 0
With l = LL¤
ANNEX 2b: Veri…cation of the existence of an analytical solution
We shall now demonstrate that the polynomial which determines the expression of i
presents at least one economically possible solution (i > 0): To do so, we simply need to
verify that the solution can be ‡anked by two values (one positive and one negative). We
therefore ‡ank P (i) by two extreme values of i:
- The developing country does not specialize in any good (i = 0): If we de…ne
i = i0 = 0; then equation 29 can be written:
P (i0) = ®¤l > 0 (30)
- The developed country satis…es all its needs through its domestic production
(i = J). According to the expression of the marginal good consumed by the domestic
economy (equation 27); the value of i corresponding to this con…guration is i = i1 =
q
2
¯ :
With this value, we obtain:
P (i1) = ¡®¤ + ¯¤i1l + ¯¤ 2¯ (1 + l)(® +
¯i1
2
) ¡ ¯¤i1
¡
® + ¯i1
¢
(J¤ + lJ ) (31)
To determine the sign of this polynomial, we proceed as follows:
With i1 =
q
2
¯ ; we know that i = J and J
¤ > J = i1.
Consequently, we can write the following relation for the last term of the polynomial:
¡¯¤i1
¡
® + ¯i1
¢
(J ¤ + lJ ) < ¡¯¤i1
¡
® + ¯i1
¢
(i1 + i1l)
¡¯¤i1 ¡® + ¯i1¢ (J ¤ + lJ ) < ¡¯¤ ¡i1¢2 ¡® + ¯i1¢ (1 + l)
¡¯¤i1
¡
® + ¯i1
¢
(J ¤ + lJ ) < ¡¯¤ 2
¯
(1 + l)® ¡ 2¯¤i1(1 + l)
By substituting the right-hand expression for the last term of equation 31, we verify:
P (i1) < ¡®¤ + ¯¤i1(1 + 2l) + ¯¤ 2¯ (1 + l)® ¡ ¯
¤ 2
¯
(1 + l)® ¡ 2¯¤i1(1 + l)
P (i1) < ¡®¤ ¡ ¯¤i1 < 0
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So, by ‡anking i in this way; we have demonstrated that our polynomial has at least
one root and that this root, with a value between i0 and i1, is economically possible.
ANNEX 2c : Equilibrium around " = 0
By proceeding to marginal development of equations 26-29, we have obtained equations
20-23. Their respective parameters can be written in the following way:
ei = µ 2:l
¯(1 + l)
¶1=2
(32)
ew = ®¤
® + ¯:ei (33)
ej = µ 2: ew
1 + l
¶1=2
(34)
ej¤ = µ2 ¡ 2 ew:l
1 + l
¶1=2
(35)
and :
a =
ej¤ + l:ejew(1 + l)¯ :1ei (36)
b =
a:¯: ew
®¤
:ei (37)
c =
a:¯
2
:ei: µei:(1 + l) + ew
®¤
¶
(38)
d =
a:ei2:¯: ewej ¤2 :
Ã
1 +
ei¯: ew
2:®¤
!
(39)
ANNEX 3a: The equations of the DFS and Matsuyama models
The supply side hypotheses are similar to our own model. Consequently, the condition
of specialization, i.e. equation 14, is identical in all three models. The di¤erences in the
choice of utility function, on the other hand, induce di¤erent equations for the balance
of trade equilibrium. To make it easier to compare the three models, the equilibrium
equations are presented under the hypothesis ¯i = 1.
DFS (1977) Matsuyama (2000)
Max U =
JR
0
¯i ln qidi Max U =
1Z
0
¯iqidi (A1)
sc w =
JR
0
piqidi sc w =
1Z
0
piqidi (A2)
Xi = pmi q¤i :L¤ =
1
J :L
¤ Xi = pmi q¤i L¤ = waiL¤ (A3)
Mi = pmi qi:L = wJ :L Mi = p
m
i qiL = a¤i L (A4)
J = J¤ = cste wL = Lw
iR
0
aidi + L
JR
i
a¤i di (A5)
L¤ = L¤w
iR
0
aidi + L¤
J¤R
i
a¤i di (A6)
X=M )
wL
iR
0
¯i = L¤
1R
i
¯ i
X=M )
L = (L + L¤)
iR
0
aidi (A7)
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- (A1) and (A2) represent the agent’s maximization programme.
- (A2) and (A3) represent the demand for imports per product addressed to the devel-
oping country and the demand for exports that this country addresses to the developed
country.
- The balance of trade equilibrium condition (A7) is obtained through (A2) and (A3).
For Matsuyama, this expression is simpli…ed with the help of equation (A5).
- (A5) and (A6) represent the exhaustion of the budget constraint in the two countries
and makes it possible to determine the number of varieties consumed in Matsuyama’s
model.
ANNEX 3b: Comparison of the e¤ect of technological shocks
The line A represents the condition of specialization (equation 14) and the line B
represents the balance of trade equilibrium condition (equations A7). B’ and A’ represent
the shifting of these lines with the occurrence of technical progress (TP). It should be
noted that the graphic representation proposed here is deliberately simpli…ed2 2 . It should
be read in the following manner:
- Along the y axis, the shift from one equilibrium to another gives the size of the
variation in relative wage
- The distance between A and A0; at any given point on the x axis, tells us the size of
the productivity gains for a good i.
From the comparison of these two distances, we can deduce the variation in the pur-
chasing power of an agent for every good consumed.
 Dornbush, Fisher, Samuleson 
(1977) 
Matsuyama (2000) 
Uniform 
technical 
progress in 
North (FUTS) 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Biased technical  
progress  
In North (FUTS) 
  
 
B 
A 
w 
A’ 
i
w
  
B 
A’ 
A 
i
i  
B 
A 
w 
A’ 
w B 
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i  
22 This presentation is intuitive. For more rigour, the reasoning in terms of variations would require
modi…cation of the scale in logarithm or the representation of shifts in a non-linear form. This would
complicate the presentation without modifying the results.
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